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NOT QUITE FILLING THE GAP: WHY THE 
MISCELLANEOUS EXPENSE ALLOWANCE 
LEAVES THE NCAA VULNERABLE TO 
ANTITRUST LITIGATION 
Drew N. Goodwin* 
Abstract: Throughout its history, the National Collegiate Athletic Associa-
tion (NCAA) has been repeatedly accused of violating antitrust law in a 
range of different ways—restricting television broadcasts, limiting coach-
es’ salaries, and capping the amount of athletic scholarships. Most recent-
ly, in the case of White v. NCAA, a class of plaintiffs argued that the 
NCAA’s artificial limitation on student-athlete compensation violated an-
titrust law. Although this case settled before trial, it represented a major 
victory for student-athletes. The NCAA is now considering a proposal— 
the Miscellaneous Expense Allowance (“MEA”)—that would raise the 
NCAA’s artificial cap on athletics-related financial aid by $2000. This legis-
lation is partially aimed at protecting the NCAA from further antitrust li-
ability, but it does not quite fill the gap. After providing a brief history of 
college athletics and student-athlete compensation, this Note then exam-
ines the mechanics of antitrust law and how courts have applied antitrust 
law in the context of the NCAA. This Note then argues that a hypothetical 
class of student-athletes could still bring a viable antitrust claim against 
the NCAA, even if the MEA is passed. Subsequently, this Note analyzes the 
arguments on both sides that would arise in such a hypothetical lawsuit. 
Introduction 
 In the 2011–2012 fiscal year, the football program at the University 
of Texas at Austin reported more than $77 million in profit.1 With 120 
players comprising the team’s 2012 team roster, each football player 
generated, on average, over $640,000 for the university during that sea-
son.2 Surprisingly, however, an English major at the University of Texas 
can receive more money under a full academic scholarship than the 
                                                                                                                      
* Drew N. Goodwin is an Articles Editor for the Boston College Law Review. 
1 Institution Data, The University of Texas at Austin, U.S. Dep’t. of Educ. Office of 
Postsecondary Educ., ope.ed.gov/athletics/GetOneInstitutionData.aspx (click “Get data 
for one institution” in the right-hand column; enter “University of Texas” for Name of 
Institution; enter “Austin” for Institution City; then search) (last visited May 16, 2013). 
2 See id.; Texas Longhorns Roster—2012, ESPN.com, http://espn.go.com/college-football/ 
team/roster/_/id/251/texas-longhorns (last visited May 14, 2013). 
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starting quarterback of the Longhorns’ football team can receive under 
a full athletic scholarship.3 If a student receives a full academic scholar-
ship from the University of Texas, he will receive a maximum of $51,998 
per year; if a student receives a full athletic scholarship, conversely, he 
will receive a maximum of only $48,246 per year.4 
 For decades, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) 
has limited the amount of athletics-based financial aid that universities 
can provide to student-athletes to a level below that allowable for aca-
demic scholarships.5 The NCAA has limited athletics-based financial aid 
to the “full grant-in-aid,” which covers tuition and fees, room and 
board, and required course-related books.6 At the same time, universi-
ties provide academic scholarships and need-based financial aid up to 
the “full cost of attendance,” which includes not only tuition and text-
books, but also miscellaneous expenses, such as school supplies, laun-
dry expenses, health and disability insurance, travel costs, and inci-
dental expenses.7 For the 2012–2013 academic year, the average 
amount of these miscellaneous expenses was approximately $3201 per 
year for public universities and $2527 for private colleges.8 
                                                                                                                      
3 See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 2011–2012 NCAA Division I Manual: Oper-
ating Bylaws art. 15.1 (2011) [hereinafter NCAA Division I Bylaws] (“A student-athlete 
may receive institutional financial aid based on athletics ability . . . up to the value of a full 
grant-in-aid,” which covers tuition, fees, room and board, and required course-related 
books); Forty Acres Scholars Program, TexasExesScholarshipFoundation.org, http://www. 
texasexesscholarshipfoundation.org/scholarships/forty-acres/ (last visited May 14, 2013) 
(describing a four-year merit scholarship for students at the University of Texas at Austin that 
covers tuition, fees, housing, food, books, and a living stipend). 
4 See NCAA Division I Bylaws, supra note 3, art. 15.1 (excluding personal and living 
expenses from allowable athletics-based financial aid); Forty Acres Scholars Program, supra 
note 3 (detailing the elements of a full academic scholarship, which includes a stipend for 
living expenses); 2012–2013 Undergraduate Cost of Attendance (COA), Finaid.UTexas.edu, 
http://finaid.utexas.edu/costs/120undergradcosts.html (last visited May 14, 2013) (show-
ing the full cost of attendance for a non-resident student to be $51,998 per year with $3752 
allocated to personal and transportation expenses). 
5 See 20 U.S.C. § 108711(1)–(3) (2006); NCAA Division I Bylaws, supra note 3, art. 
15.1 (“A student-athlete may receive institutional financial aid based on athletics ability . . . 
up to the value of a full grant-in-aid.”). 
6 NCAA Division I Bylaws, supra note 3, art. 15.02.5. 
7 20 U.S.C. § 108711(1)–(3) (authorizing students to receive need-based and merit-
based aid up to the full cost of attendance, including miscellaneous living expenses); Forty 
Acres Scholars Program, supra note 3 (exemplifying how some undergraduate institutions will 
provide full academic scholarships that include a “living stipend”). 
8 Coll. Bd., Trends in College Pricing 2012, at 11 fig. 1 (2012), http://trends.college 
board.org/sites/default/files/college-pricing-2012-full-report-121203.pdf. In 2012–13 the 
average student at a four-year public college who lived on campus spent $2091 on “personal” 
expenses and $1110 on transportation. Id. By combining these totals, the average gap be-
tween a “full grant-in-aid” and the full cost of attendance was $3201 at public universities. See 
 
2013] Boston College International & Comparative Law Review 1279 
 On October 27, 2011 the NCAA increased the limit of athletics-
based financial aid through a piece of legislation known as the Miscel-
laneous Expense Allowance (“MEA”).9 This legislation allowed universi-
ties to provide student-athletes receiving full athletic scholarships with 
additional financial aid “up to the institution’s calculation of full cost of 
attendance or $2000, whichever is less.”10 Nearly two months after the 
legislation passed, 160 schools signed onto override legislation to block 
the MEA.11 The NCAA has suspended the legislation for now, and is 
currently still considering different proposals from the Student-Athlete 
Well-Being Working Group.12 If passed, legislation would likely impose 
the same $2000 cap as originally proposed.13 
 The push to increase compensation for student-athletes has been 
gaining momentum in recent years, most notably after the 2006 case in 
the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, White v. 
NCAA.14 In White, the court ruled that a class of former student-athletes 
sufficiently alleged an anticompetitive agreement among NCAA mem-
bers, allowing the plaintiff class to survive summary judgment.15 The 
plaintiffs argued that in a free market student-athletes would receive 
athletics-based aid up to the full cost of attendance—the same amount 
                                                                                                                      
id.; NCAA Division I Bylaws, supra note 3, art. 15.02.5. In 2012–2013 the average student at 
a four-year private college who lived on campus spent $1570 on “personal” expenses and 
$957 on transportation. Coll. Bd., supra, at 11 fig. 1. By combining these totals, the average 
gap between a “full grant-in-aid” and the full cost of attendance was $2527 at private colleges. 
See id.; NCAA Division I Bylaws, supra note 3, art. 15.02.5. 
9 See Michelle Brutlag Hosick, DI Board Adopts Improvements in Academic Standards and Stu-
dent-Athlete Support, NCAA.org (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/ 
public/ncaa/resources/latest+news/2011/october/di+board+of+directors+adopt+changes 
+to+academic+and+student-athlete+welfare; see also Student-Athlete Benefits, NCAA.org (last 
updated Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Finances/ 
Finances+Student+Athlete+Benefits. (referring to the legislation as the Miscellaneous Ex-
pense Allowance). 
10 See Hosick, supra note 9. 
11 See Lee Davis, NCAA Rescinds $2000 Stipend to Athletes, Chattanoogan, Jan. 18, 2012, 
http://www.chattanoogan.com/articles/article_217572.asp. 
12 See Michelle Brutlag Hosick, Directors Support Reform Efforts, NCAA.com (Apr. 26, 2012), 
http://www.ncaa.com/news/ncaa/article/2012-04-26/directors-support-reform-efforts. 
13 See id. (“The Division I Board of Directors reaffirmed Saturday its support for a 
$2,000 miscellaneous expense allowance . . . .”). 
14 See Second Amended Complaint for Plaintiff at 24–26, White v. NCAA, No. CV-06-0999 
RGK (C.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2006), ECF No. 75. In October of 2011, more than 300 college 
football and basketball players signed a petition asking the NCAA for a cut of television reve-
nue generated from college sports along with a higher cap on athletics-based aid. See Alan 
Scher Zagier, College Athletes Press NCAA Reform, Yahoo! News (Oct. 25, 2011), http://news. 
yahoo.com/apnewsbreak-college-athletes-press-ncaa-reform-211844071.html. 
15 Denial of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint at 1, White 
v. NCAA, No. CV-06-0999 RGK (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2006), ECF No. 72. 
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granted through full academic scholarships.16 Although this case was 
settled before trial, it provided future litigants with a blueprint for an 
antitrust suit against the NCAA that would at least survive a motion to 
dismiss.17 
 Even if the NCAA addresses the problem highlighted in White by 
enacting the MEA, the NCAA would continue to be vulnerable to anti-
trust suits.18 Yet, enactment of the MEA would reduce the amount of 
antitrust damages awarded to a successful plaintiff class.19 The terms of 
the MEA would set a higher cap to compensation, but it would still be 
an artificially created cap below the full cost of attendance at more than 
half the universities in the country.20 Until the NCAA permits universi-
ties to grant athletics-based aid up to the full cost of attendance without 
any artificial caps or restrictions, the NCAA remains vulnerable to anti-
trust suits from student-athletes.21 
 Part I of this Note briefly outlines the history of the NCAA and the 
history of student-athlete compensation and explains how that com-
pensation structure would change under the MEA.22 Part II explores 
the line of cases involving antitrust challenges to the NCAA.23 Part III 
then argues that if the NCAA were to pass the MEA, it would still be 
vulnerable to an antitrust suit by student-athletes.24 Part III also evalu-
ates the arguments that would be posed in such a hypothetical suit.25 
                                                                                                                      
16 Second Amended Complaint for Plaintiff, supra note 14, at 15. 
17 See id.; Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement at 2, White v. NCAA, No. CV-06-
0999 RGK (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2008), ECF No. 253. 
18 See Second Amended Complaint for Plaintiff, supra note 14, at 15. 
19 See Hosick, supra note 9. See generally Second Amended Complaint for Plaintiff, supra 
note 14 (seeking damages for the difference between the NCAA’s artificial cap on attend-
ance and the full cost of attendance as defined by Congress). 
20 Coll. Bd., supra note 8, 11 fig. 1 (showing that the average student at a public uni-
versity pays $3201 per year in miscellaneous and living expenses and that the average stu-
dent at a private university pays $2527 per year in miscellaneous and living expenses); 
Hosick, supra note 9 (proposing an increase to the NCAA’s cap on athletics-based aid that 
takes into account $2000 for miscellaneous and living expenses). 
21 See 20 U.S.C. § 108711 (2006); Second Amended Complaint for Plaintiff, supra note 
14, at 24–26; Coll. Bd., supra note 8, 11 fig. 1; Hosick, supra note 9. 
22 See infra notes 26–77 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 78–185 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 186–302 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 186–302 and accompanying text. 
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I. A Brief History of the NCAA and Athlete Compensation 
 Today the NCAA is a behemoth organization whose growth has 
transformed college athletics into a multi-billion dollar industry.26 Uni-
versities, athletic conferences, and television networks have increased 
their profits exponentially over the last few decades.27 Student-athletes, 
however, have not increased their compensation beyond the value of 
their athletic scholarships.28 
 Section A of this Part provides a brief history of the NCAA, and 
focuses on the influx of money and scandals in college sports.29 Section 
B then details how student-athletes are currently compensated for their 
work on the field and how the proposed MEA would affect this com-
pensation structure.30 
A. The Rise of the NCAA 
 The NCAA was formed in the early twentieth century, in the words 
of the NCAA itself, “to protect young people from the dangerous and 
exploitive athletics practices of the time.”31 College football was the ma-
jor source of said danger and exploitation.32 Serious injuries and deaths 
on the field increased at an alarming rate, while illegal inducements 
and recruiting violations off the field became the norm.33 Much of the 
                                                                                                                      
26 See Rachel Bachman & Matthew Futterman, College Football’s Big-Money, Big-Risk Business 
Model, Wall St. J., Dec. 10, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324024 
004578169472607407806.html (finding that the total amount of money spent by television 
networks for contracts to televise games in the top college football conferences over the next 
15 years has risen to approximately $25.5 billion); Time Warner Joins CBS in $10.8 Billion March 
Madness TV Deal, FOXBusiness (Apr. 22, 2010), http://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/ 
2010/04/22/time-warner-joins-cbs-billion-march-madness-tv-deal/ (finding that Time Warn-
er and CBS paid $10.8 billion to gain exclusive rights to televise the NCAA men’s basketball 
tournament for a 14-year period); infra notes 45–51 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 31–57 and accompanying text (describing the rise of college athletics). 
28 See infra notes 58–77 and accompanying text (describing the structure of student-
athlete compensation). 
29 See infra notes 31–57 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 58–77 and accompanying text. 
31 History, NCAA.org, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/about+ 
the+ncaa/history (last visited May 14, 2013). 
32 See Joanna Davenport, From Crew to Commercialism—The Paradox of Sport in Higher Edu-
cation, in Sport and Higher Education 5, 7 (Donald Chu et al. eds., 1985) (observing, in 
reference to football, that “[n]o other sport, especially in the big universities, was received 
with such enthusiasm, created more controversy, or caused more meetings”). 
33 See id. at 11. According to college football records, eighteen players were killed in 
1905, with at least 149 other serious injuries. Joseph N. Crowley, In the Arena: The 
NCAA’s First Century 43 (2006). 
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public was outraged and wanted to abolish college football altogether.34 
President Theodore Roosevelt met with leaders of college athletics to 
urge sweeping changes, and in December 1905, sixty-two major institu-
tions became charter members of the Intercollegiate Athletic Associa-
tion of the United States (IAAUS).35 The IAAUS was renamed as the 
NCAA in 1910.36 
 The NCAA did not begin as the massive organization that it is to-
day.37 Originally, the NCAA played mostly an advisory role—pushing 
for greater institutional control of intercollegiate athletics and provid-
ing a forum for discussion of all issues involving college sports.38 In the 
1950s, however, the NCAA transformed itself into a powerful regulatory 
body with full authority to police and penalize member universities.39 
The rise in popularity of television coincided with the end of World 
War II to create a period of booming growth for college athletics.40 Col-
lege sports became paramount as athletic departments evolved into 
machines capable of generating significant revenue for universities.41 
 Unsurprisingly, a series of recruiting abuses and scandals soon fol-
lowed.42 The need for institutional control and leadership became clear, 
so member schools authorized the NCAA to fill this void.43 Almost im-
mediately after being named executive director of the NCAA in 1951, 
Walter Byers delegated enforcement powers to the NCAA’s Council, of-
ficially authorizing the NCAA to levy sanctions against member institu-
tions for rules violations.44 
                                                                                                                      
34 See Crowley, supra note 33, at 43. For example, after the death of a player during a 
football game in November of 1905, the Chancellor of New York University sent a telegram 
to the President of Harvard University to “address the football problem.” Id. at 44. When 
Harvard’s President declined, the Chancellor of New York University gathered with stu-
dents and faculty to call for either the abolition of football or drastic reforms to the game. 
Id. 
35 History, supra note 31. 
36 Id. 
37 See Matthew J. Mitten et al., Targeted Reform of Commercialized Intercollegiate Athletics, 47 
San Diego L. Rev. 779, 788–89 (2010) (describing the limited role of the “nascent NCAA”). 
38 See Davenport, supra note 32, at 12; Mitten et al., supra note 37, at 788–89. 
39 See Davenport, supra note 32, at 12; Mitten et al., supra note 37, at 791 (explaining 
that in the 1950s the NCAA became authorized “to censure, penalize, expel, and enforce 
sanctions against institutions”). 
40 See Mitten et al., supra note 37, at 790. 
41 See Davenport, supra note 32, at 12. 
42 See Rodney K. Smith, The National Collegiate Athletic Association’s Death Penalty: How 
Educators Punish Themselves and Others, 62 Ind. L.J. 985, 992 (1987) (noting two serious 
incidents: (1) gambling scandals involving point shaving by athletes in 1945, and (2) 
agreements to fix games by athletes in 1951). 
43 See Davenport, supra note 32, at 12–13. 
44 See Mitten et al., supra note 37, at 791; History, supra note 31. 
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 For the next sixty years, the NCAA and college athletics expanded 
into enormous, monolithic industries.45 Currently, the NCAA regulates 
more than 400,000 student athletes at over 1000 colleges and universi-
ties.46 College football programs have ballooned into cash cows for 
many universities—the programs at Texas, Florida, Georgia, Michigan, 
and Penn State, for example, each earn between $40 million and $80 
million in profits per year.47 In 2011, the Big Ten, a major athletic con-
ference within the NCAA, gave each of its member schools a record 
$22.6 million—a large portion of which was earned from its own televi-
sion network, the Big Ten Network.48 On August 26, 2011, ESPN 
launched the Longhorn Network, a television network entirely devoted 
to University of Texas athletics.49 As part of its agreement with ESPN, the 
University of Texas is guaranteed an average of $15 million per year for 
the next twenty years, for a total of $300 million.50 The University of Ok-
lahoma is considering creating its own television network, and other 
universities may soon follow suit.51 
 A wide river of money has been flowing to college athletic depart-
ments, but it has been followed by a constant stream of cheating scan-
dals and recruiting violations.52 In the fall of 2010, rumors swirled 
around Auburn University’s star quarterback Cam Newton that New-
ton’s father had used a recruiter to extract up to $180,000 from Missis-
                                                                                                                      
45 See Mitten et al., supra note 32, at 791 (providing an overview of the economic suc-
cess of the NCAA over the past sixty years). 
46 Differences Among the Three Divisions, NCAA.org, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/ 
connect/public/NCAA/About+the+NCAA+OLD/Who+We+Are/Differences+Among+ 
the+Divisions/ (last updated Dec. 7, 2011) (explaining that the NCAA contains 1079 member 
institutions—335 in Division I, 302 in Division II, and 442 in Division III); Who We Are, 
NCAA.org, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/About+the+NCAA/ 
Who+We+Are+landing+page (last visited May 14, 2013) (stating that more than 400,000 stu-
dent-athletes compete within the NCAA’s three divisions). 
47 See Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, Atlantic Monthly, Oct. 2011, at 80, 
82 (detailing a multitude of recent scandals in college sports and explaining the hypocrisy 
in a system of college sports that generates hundreds of millions of dollars for universities 
but does not compensate athletes beyond the cost of tuition). 
48 See College Notebook: Big Ten Schools Make Record Money, Columbus Dispatch ( July 20, 
2011, 6:44 AM), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/sports/2011/07/20/0720-college- 
notebook.html. 
49 See Michael Hiestand, How Texas Is Steering College TV Sports; Longhorn Network, First of 
its Kind for a School Sparks Questions, Debate, as Others Ponder Move, USA Today, Aug. 12, 
2011, at 1A. 
50 See Aaron Kuriloff & David Mildenberg, ESPN Longhorn Network Cash Tips U.S. College 
Sports Leagues into Disarray, Bloomberg (Nov. 3, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2011-11-03/espn-longhorn-network-cash-tips-u-s-college-sports-leagues-into-disarray. html. 
51 See id. 
52 See Branch, supra note 47, at 82. 
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sippi State University in exchange for his son to play there.53 In May of 
2011, Jim Tressel resigned as head football coach of Ohio State Univer-
sity after information leaked that many of his players had exchanged 
team memorabilia for cash at a tattoo parlor.54 And in the summer of 
2011, the NCAA investigated allegations that a University of Miami 
booster had provided more than seventy football players with millions 
of dollars in cash and services over the course of eight years.55 Although 
these are the most high-profile scandals in recent memory, countless 
other violations litter the landscape of college athletics.56 As one com-
mentator explained, “when you combine so much money with such 
high, almost tribal, stakes . . . corruption is likely to follow.”57 
B. The Compensation, or Lack Thereof, for NCAA Athletes 
1. NCAA Compensation Rules Prior to 2011 
 The NCAA Bylaws consist of rules and regulations that cover a 
multitude of issues, including ethical conduct, amateurism, recruiting, 
academic eligibility, and practice and playing seasons.58 One of these 
bylaws governs the financial aid compensation to student-athletes.59 For 
decades, student-athletes have been limited to a “full grant-in-aid,” 
which the NCAA defines as “financial aid that consists of tuition and 
                                                                                                                      
53 See id. 
54 See George Dohrmann, The Fall of Jim Tressel, Sports Illustrated, June 6, 2011, at 
40, 42. 
55 See Charles Robinson, Renegade Miami Football Booster Spells Out Illicit Benefits to Players, 
Yahoo! Sports (Aug. 16, 2009, 5:37 PM), http://sports.yahoo.com/investigations/news?slug 
=cr-renegade_miami_booster_details_illicit_benefits_081611. 
56 See Branch, supra note 47, at 82. For example, in 2010 the University of Southern 
California football program was banned from post-season play for two years along with 
other sanctions because Heisman Trophy winner Reggie Bush received improper benefits. 
See Gary Klein, Bush Beleaguered; The High Price USC Is Paying for NCAA Sanctions Goes Well 
Beyond the Diminishment of Its Football and Basketball Programs, to Revenue Losses Running Into 
the Tens of Millions, L.A. Times, June 22, 2011, at C1. In 2009, the University of Memphis 
was forced to vacate its record thirty-eight basketball victories and national title game ap-
pearance from 2007–2008 because star point guard Derrick Rose’s former high school 
teammate fraudulently took his SAT’s for him. See Luke Winn, Calipari Not Implicated in 
Another Scandal, but He’s Far from Clean, SI.com (Aug. 20, 2009, 12:55 PM), http://sports 
illustrated.cnn.com/2009/writers/luke_winn/08/20/memphis/index.html. In 2009, the 
Florida State University football team was forced to vacate wins and serve four years of 
probation from an academic cheating scandal. See Heather Dinich, NCAA Penalties Extend to 
10 FSU Sports, ESPN.com (Mar. 7, 2009, 12:32 PM) http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/ 
story?id=3958292. 
57 Branch, supra note 47, at 82. 
58 NCAA Division I Bylaws, supra note 3, art. 10–17. 
59 Id. art. 15. 
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fees, room and board, and required course-related books.”60 Although 
in 1986 Congress authorized students to receive need-based or merit-
based aid up to the “full cost of attendance,” which includes additional 
coverage for miscellaneous personal expenses and travel, the NCAA did 
not authorize its member institutions to do so for athletics-based aid.61 
 Despite these restrictions, student-athletes have been able to re-
ceive additional financial aid through other means.62 By receiving assis-
tance through Pell Grants, the Special Assistance Fund, the Student-
Athlete Opportunity Fund, and other forms of financial aid unrelated 
to athletic ability, students can receive financial aid up to the “full cost 
of attendance” as defined by Congress.63 These alternative routes to 
receive financial aid demonstrate that student-athletes can, under cer-
tain circumstances, receive the “full cost of attendance,” regardless of 
NCAA restrictions.64 Unlike athletic scholarships, however, these forms 
of compensation are not available to all student-athletes, and they can-
not be used by universities to recruit potential athletes.65 
2. The New Miscellaneous Expense Allowance 
 On October 27, 2011 the NCAA changed its policy regarding ath-
letics-based financial aid, but it was short-lived.66 Specifically, the Divi-
sion I Board of Directors adopted legislation allowing student-athletes 
                                                                                                                      
60 Id. art. 15.02.5. 
61 Compare 20 U.S.C. § 108711 (2006) (authorizing students to receive need-based and 
merit-based financial aid up to the full cost of attendance, which includes miscellaneous 
and travel expenses), with NCAA Division I Bylaws, supra note 3, art. 15.02.5 (authoriz-
ing NCAA student-athletes to receive athletics-based aid up to a “full grant-in-aid,” which 
does not include miscellaneous and travel expenses). 
62 NCAA Division I Bylaws, supra note 3, art. 15.1. 
63 Id.; see 20 U.S.C. § 108711. The Federal Pell Grant program provides need-based 
grants to low-income undergraduate and certain graduate students. See Federal Pell Grant 
Program, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., http://www2.ed.gov/programs/fpg/index.html(last visited 
May 15, 2013). Pell Grants are distributed based on financial need and not based on ath-
letic ability. See id. The grant amount depends on the student’s financial needs, the cost of 
attendance at the school, and other factors. Id. The Special Assistance Fund is most typical-
ly used to supply student-athletes with clothing, necessities, and dental examinations. See 
Christian Dennie, White Out Full Grant-in-Aid: An Antitrust Action the NCAA Cannot Afford to 
Lose, 7 Va. Sports & Ent. L.J. 97, 102 n.36 (2007). The Student-Athlete Opportunity Fund 
is generally used for overall athletic department development, including computers, sum-
mer school tuition, and events for student-athletes. See id. at 102 n.37. 
64 See NCAA Division I Bylaws, supra note 3, art. 15.1. 
65 See id. 
66 See Hosick, supra note 12 (announcing in January of 2012 that the NCAA had sus-
pended the MEA but would vote on it again in April of 2012); Hosick, supra note 9 (an-
nouncing in October of 2011 that the NCAA would allow student-athletes to receive a sti-
pend for living expenses up to a maximum of $2000 per year). 
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receiving full athletic scholarships, or full scholarships that combine 
financial aid with athletics-based aid, to receive additional athletics aid 
“up to the institution’s calculation of full cost of attendance or $2000, 
whichever is less.”67 This legislation, deemed the Miscellaneous Ex-
pense Allowance (“MEA”), allowed schools to provide student-athletes 
with extra money to pay for personal expenses that were previously not 
taken into account.68 The $2000 figure was to be adjusted based on the 
Consumer Price Index, so the NCAA would not need to approve new 
figures as the cost of living changed.69 
 Although an additional $2000 might not seem like much when 
compared to the billions of dollars generated in the college sports in-
dustry, this legislation would greatly impact the lives of student-
athletes.70 Due to the cap on athletics-based financial aid, student-
athletes have difficulty paying for basic necessities, such as school sup-
plies, laundry expenses, health and disability insurance, travel costs, 
and incidental expenditures.71 
 Many universities strongly opposed this new rule from the outset.72 
In fact, 160 schools signed onto override legislation by late December 
2011 to block the MEA.73 Consequently, the NCAA suspended the rule 
until the Board of Directors convened on January 14, 2012 at the 
NCAA Convention.74 At the Convention, the Board reaffirmed its sup-
port for the MEA, but directed the Student-Athlete Well-Being Group 
(“SAWBG”) to alter the legislation and come back to the presidents in 
April of 2012 with a modified proposal.75 Consequently, in April 2012, 
the SAWBG submitted three different options for implementing the 
MEA, all of which involved an additional $2000 provided to student-
                                                                                                                      
67 See Hosick, supra note 9. 
68 See id.; Miscellaneous Expense Allowance, supra note 9; see also NCAA Division I By-
laws, supra note 3, art. 15.1 (failing to authorize NCAA institutions to include costs for 
miscellaneous and travel expenses within athletics-based aid). 
69 See Hosick, supra note 9. Furthermore, the Division I Board of Directors decided not 
to revisit the $2000 figure for three years. See id. 
70 See Second Amended Complaint for Plaintiff, supra note 14, at 3; Thomas A. Baker 
III et al., White v. NCAA: A Chink in the Antitrust Armor, 21 J. Legal Aspects Sport 75, 75 
(2011) (illustrating how Ramogi Huma, a football player at UCLA in the 1990s, incurred 
$6000 of credit card debt at a 19% interest rate because his so-called full athletic scholar-
ship did not cover his living expenses). 
71 See Second Amended Complaint for Plaintiff, supra note 14, at 3; Baker et al., supra 
note 70, at 75; Dennie, supra note 63, at 103. 
72 See Davis, supra note 11. 
73 Id. 
74 See id. 
75 See Hosick, supra note 12. 
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athletes above traditional NCAA limits.76 Currently, more than a year 
later, NCAA members are still debating the merits of the MEA, and it 
has not yet been passed.77 
II. The NCAA and Antitrust 
 Because of its wide reach within collegiate sports, the NCAA has 
been a prime target for antitrust litigation.78 Many paradigmatic anti-
trust cases stem from the creation of large associations that engage in 
horizontal price-fixing agreements.79 By promulgating rules and creat-
ing across-the-board standards for over 1200 universities, the NCAA 
became especially vulnerable to antitrust scrutiny.80 
 Section A of this Part articulates the fundamental mechanics of 
antitrust law.81 Section B then outlines the antitrust case law pertaining 
to the NCAA.82 
                                                                                                                      
76 See id. The three different proposals from the SAWBG include: (1) allowing each 
school to provide student-athletes with $2000 of additional aid, as originally proposed; (2) 
basing eligibility for the MEA on the student-athletes’ individual financial needs; and (3) 
allowing each school to provide student-athletes with $2000 of additional aid from the 
Student-Athlete Opportunity Fund. See id. 
77 See NCAA Changes Rules at Convention, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 2013, http://www.nytimes. 
com/2013/01/20/sports/ncaa-changes-rules-at-convention.html. 
78 See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984) (holding 
that the NCAA’s restricted television plan for college football violated the Sherman Act as a 
horizontal output restriction on college football telecasts); Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1024 
(10th Cir. 1998) (holding that the NCAA regulation limiting the salaries of certain coaches to 
$16,000 annually violated the Sherman Act as horizontal price-fixing); McCormack v. NCAA, 
845 F.2d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that NCAA regulations restricting athletes from 
being compensated beyond the cost of attendance are not a violation of the Sherman Act 
because it is necessary to preserve amateurism in college athletics). 
79 See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 356–57 (1982) (holding 
that an agreement by physicians to set maximum prices with insurance companies constitut-
ed a per se violation of the Sherman Act); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys. (BMI ), 
441 U.S. 1, 21, 24–25 (1979) (reasoning that by selling blanket licenses to copyrighted musi-
cal compositions at negotiated fees, petitioners had not committed unlawful price-fixing 
because a blanket license was a necessary component of an efficiency-enhancing joint ven-
ture). 
80 See, e.g., Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120; Law, 134 F.3d at 1024; McCormack, 845 F.2d at 
1345. 
81 See infra notes 83–134 and accompanying text. 
82 See infra notes 135–185 and accompanying text. 
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A. Antitrust Fundamentals 
1. The Sherman Act and U.S. Antitrust Law 
 The two primary concerns of antitrust law are (1) agreements 
among competitors that restrict competition, and (2) the willful acqui-
sition or maintenance of monopoly power.83 Anticompetitive agree-
ments among competitors in a market allow firms to raise prices or re-
strict output, and thereby increase profits to supracompetitive levels.84 
Price-fixing agreements, output restrictions, and market divisions are 
classic examples of such behavior.85 Attempts to acquire or maintain 
monopoly power can take many forms; dominant firms with monopoly 
power might exclude rivals from the market, impair rivals’ efficiency, or 
impede the entry or expansion that would restore competition.86 These 
two types of conduct are undesirable from an economic standpoint be-
cause they reduce efficiency in the marketplace and harm consumers.87 
The Sherman Act was designed to thwart these anticompetitive practic-
es, and it governs all organizations, including the NCAA.88 
 The Sherman Act forms the basis for most antitrust claims in the 
NCAA context.89 Section 1 of the Sherman Act, particularly as applied 
                                                                                                                      
83 See Einer Elhauge, United States Antitrust Law and Economics 2 (2d ed. 
2011). 
84 Id. at 2–3. “Supracompetitive” profits are profits above what can be expected in a com-
petitive market. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 111–13. High profits may indicate that a busi-
ness either has a unique legal or competitive advantage, or is engaging in anticompetitive 
behavior designed to eliminate competition. See id.; see also 2B Phillip E. Areeda et al., 
Antitrust Law ¶ 532 (3d ed. 2007) (discussing market power and market definition). 
85 Elhauge, supra note 83, at 2; see Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120; Law, 134 F.3d at 
1024; McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1345. “Price-fixing” is a practice whereby competitors agree 
to buy or sell a product, service, or commodity at a fixed price, usually at supracompetitive 
levels. See Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 345–48. “Output restrictions” arise when a single firm or a 
group of competitors artificially control the supply of a certain product in the marketplace 
to maintain the price at a certain level. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 99–101. “Market divi-
sions” occur when competitors agree to avoid competing with each other and by staying 
within certain fixed territories, thus removing competition within these given areas. See N. 
Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
86 Elhauge, supra note 83, at 2–3. 
87 See id. at 2–3. 
88 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2006); Elhauge, supra note 83, at 10; see also Maurice E. 
Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. Rev. 551, 557–68 (2012) (explaining the 
current and historical goals of antitrust law and economic policy in the United States). 
89 15 U.S.C. § 1; see, e.g., Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 88, 120 (holding that the NCAA vio-
lated Section 1 of the Sherman Act through its restrictions on televising football games); 
Law, 134 F.3d at 1012, 1024 (stating that the NCAA violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act 
by restricting compensation for entry-level coaches); Second Amended Complaint for 
Plaintiff, supra note 14, at 6 (alleging that the NCAA had violated Section 1 of the Sher-
man Act by fixing the amount of financial aid to Division I student athletes). 
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to horizontal price-fixing agreements, is the focus of this Note.90 Sec-
tion 1 declares “every contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations” to be illegal.91 Nearly every con-
tract that binds two parties to an agreed course of conduct restricts 
trade, however, and the Supreme Court has accordingly limited the 
Sherman Act to forbid only unreasonable restraints of trade.92 To prevail 
on a Section 1 claim, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant (1) par-
ticipated in an agreement that (2) unreasonably restrained trade in the 
relevant market.93 
 One notable feature of U.S. antitrust law is that it provides com-
pensation to injured plaintiffs in the form of treble damages.94 Conse-
quently, private suits are a prominent method of enforcement.95 Typi-
cally the damage suffered by one individual defendant in an antitrust 
case is small, but the prospect of treble damages combined with class 
action litigation helps deter anticompetitive behavior.96 In addition to 
monetary damages, plaintiffs can also seek injunctive relief to prevent 
or undo anticompetitive conduct.97 
2. Horizontal Price-Fixing Is Usually Per Se Illegal 
 A group of student-athletes could bring a private suit against the 
NCAA, and argue that the Miscellaneous Expense Allowance (MEA) 
acts as a horizontal price-fixing agreement that unreasonably restrains 
trade because it artificially caps financial aid to student-athletes below 
the full cost of attendance.98 Certainly the MEA restrains trade—just 
                                                                                                                      
90 15 U.S.C. § 1. Some of the other main sources of antitrust law include the Clayton 
Act of 1914, the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, and the Robinson-Patman Act of 
1936. 2 Areeda et al., supra note 84, ¶¶ 301–302 (discussing the relationship of antitrust 
laws to the common law and to each other). 
91 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
92 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 98 (“[E]very contract is a restraint of trade, and as we have 
repeatedly recognized, the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit only unreasonable re-
straints of trade.”); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911) (explaining 
that the plain meaning of the Sherman Act is “broad enough to embrace every conceiva-
ble contract” and therefore it must be interpreted to forbid only unreasonable restraints 
on trade). 
93 See 15 U.S.C. § 15; Law, 134 F.3d at 1016. 
94 See 15 U.S.C. § 15. 
95 See Elhauge, supra note 83, at 14. 
96 See id. 
97 See 15 U.S.C. § 26; Elhauge, supra note 83, at 24–25. 
98 See Hosick, supra note 9; infra notes 186–302 and accompanying text. 
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like any contract between two parties—but the key question is whether 
it unreasonably restrains trade.99 
 To determine whether a defendant’s conduct unreasonably re-
strains trade, courts use two different approaches: the per se rule and 
the rule of reason.100 The per se rule condemns practices that are en-
tirely void of redeeming competitive rationales.101 Once a practice is 
identified as per se illegal, the analysis ends and the court need not ex-
amine the practice’s impact on the market or the procompetitive justi-
fications advanced by the defendant before finding a violation of anti-
trust law.102 
 Horizontal price-fixing is normally condemned as per se illegal.103 
Horizontal price-fixing occurs when firms competing at the same level 
of the market, such as a group of manufacturers or distributors, agree to 
fix or otherwise stabilize the prices that they will charge for their prod-
ucts or services.104 For example, in 1982 in Arizona v. Maricopa County 
Medical Society, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that an agreement 
among physicians setting the maximum fees that participating physi-
cians could claim in full payment for health services provided to policy-
holders was per se unlawful.105 Although the defendants alleged 
procompetitive justifications for the agreement, the Court explained 
                                                                                                                      
99 See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 98; Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 60; Hosick, supra note 9. 
100 See Law, 134 F.3d at 1016. 
101 See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. 356 U.S. at 5 (holding that certain practices can be conclu-
sively presumed to be unreasonable without any elaborate inquiry “because of their perni-
cious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue”); SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa 
USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 963 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that analyzing whether a certain 
practice is reasonable is irrelevant when experience shows that the practice is “entirely 
void of redeeming competitive rationales”). 
102 See Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 
289 (1985) (“This per se approach permits categorical judgments with respect to certain 
business practices that have proved to be predominantly anticompetitive.”); Maricopa, 457 
U.S. at 344 (“Once experience with a particular kind of restraint enables the Court to pre-
dict with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it, it has applied a conclusive 
presumption that the restraint is unreasonable.”); Ernest Gellhorn & Teresa Tatham, Mak-
ing Sense Out of the Rule of Reason, 35 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 155, 156–57 (1985) (explaining 
that courts treat some anticompetitive practices as illegal per se without considering their 
purpose, justification, or effect on the market). If a practice is considered per se unlawful, 
a defendant may still argue that a per se rule should be reevaluated. See, e.g., Leegin Crea-
tive Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007) (holding that the applica-
tion of the per se rule to minimum resale price maintenance agreements was erroneous). 
103 See, e.g., FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 436 n.19 (1990) 
(“Horizontal price-fixing . . . has been consistently analyzed as a per se violation for many 
decades.”); Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 348. 
104 See Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 345–48. 
105 Id. at 335, 356–57. 
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that the “anticompetitive potential inherent in all price-fixing agree-
ments justifies their facial invalidation.”106 By not allowing the insurance 
companies to deal directly with individual physicians, the defendants 
had unlawfully thwarted free-market competition.107 Accordingly, the 
Court refused to even consider the procompetitive justifications for the 
defendants’ behavior and instead declared the practice per se illegal.108 
3. The Ancillary Restraints Doctrine, the Rule of Reason, and the 
“Quick-Look” Rule of Reason 
 Despite the fear of abuse, the Supreme Court has held that hori-
zontal restraints are a necessary component of certain industries under 
the ancillary restraints doctrine.109 For example, in 1979 in Broadcast 
Music, Inc.  v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (BMI ), the Court found 
that the issuance of blanket licenses to copyrighted musical composi-
tions at fixed rates was not a per se violation.110 BMI represented thou-
sands of copyright owners in licensing negotiations with CBS and 
charged set fees for the use of all licensed works.111 Although this prac-
tice was a paradigmatic example of price-fixing, the Court refused to 
apply the per se rule because the blanket licenses stemmed from prac-
tical necessity.112 The Court held that the blanket licenses were neces-
sary because they significantly reduced transaction costs associated with 
individual negotiations and potentially reduced costs to consumers as 
well; the blanket licenses themselves, furthermore, could not exist 
without a set fee arrangement.113 Here, the Court established what 
would later be deemed the ancillary restraints doctrine, which holds 
that if a restraint on trade is incidental to the legitimate and competi-
tive purposes of a business venture, then it is not per se illegal.114 
 Accordingly, when an industry requires some restraints on compe-
tition in order to exist at all, courts instead apply the rule of reason 
analysis.115 Rule of reason analysis requires a court to analyze the prac-
                                                                                                                      
106 Id. at 351. 
107 See id. 
108 See id. at 354–55. 
109 BMI, 441 U.S. at 21; see also Law, 134 F.3d at 1017 (“[T]he Supreme Court recog-
nized [in BMI] . . . that certain products require horizontal restraints, including horizontal 
price-fixing, in order to exist at all.”). 
110 441 U.S. at 24–25. 
111 Id. at 5. 
112 See id. at 21. 
113 Id. 
114 See Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 7–8 (2006); BMI, 441 U.S. at 21. 
115 See, e.g., BMI, 441 U.S. at 23–24. 
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tice’s effect on competition in three steps.116 First, the plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the agreement has a substantially adverse effect on 
competition within the relevant product and geographic markets.117 
Anticompetitive effects are often difficult to prove, however, because it 
is sometimes nearly impossible to analyze the market effects of the chal-
lenged conduct in a vacuum.118 Therefore, a plaintiff may establish an-
ticompetitive effects indirectly by proving that the defendant possessed 
“market power”—the ability to raise prices above those that would pre-
vail in a competitive market.119 
 Proving market power requires the plaintiff to define the relevant 
market by evaluating demand elasticity, that is, how quickly consumers 
will respond to increased prices by purchasing substitute products.120 
The way a market is defined will ultimately determine whether reason-
able alternatives to the defendant’s product or services exist in the 
market.121 If there are few reasonable alternatives for a defendant’s 
product within a properly defined antitrust market, the defendant will 
                                                                                                                      
116 See id. 
117 See FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460–61 (1986); United States v. 
Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that agreements between Ivy League 
institutions regarding financial aid packages for prospective students violated antitrust laws 
because they lowered the students’ ability to receive the highest possible compensation 
and therefore adversely affected competition). 
118 See Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 668. 
119 See Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460–61; Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. 
Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 27 (1984). 
120 See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 111; see also U.S. DOJ & FTC, Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines § 4.1.1 (Aug. 19, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guide 
lines/hmg-2010.pdf (explaining the hypothetical price increase methodology for defining 
a product market). A product becomes its own market in a given region if a hypothetical 
monopolist controlling the entire product could impose a “significant” price increase 
above competitive levels. See id.; 2B Areeda et al., supra note 84, ¶¶ 536–537 (summariz-
ing the hypothetical price increase methodology for defining a product market). The gov-
ernment’s merger guidelines suggest finding a market only if a hypothetical monopolist 
could implement a “small but significant and nontransitory increase in price” (“SSNIP”). 
See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, § 4.1.1. The SSNIP is typically presumed to be a 5% 
increase in prices that is maintained for one year, but this number could increase or de-
crease depending on the nature of the industry and the firm’s position in the industry. See 
id. § 4.1.2. 
121 See id.; Elhauge, supra note 83, at 183–93. For example, in Board of Regents, the 
Court determined that college football games are inherently unique as a sporting event 
and attract a certain demographic of fans that cannot be replicated with similar forms of 
entertainment. See 468 U.S. at 111. Thus, according to the Court, college football broad-
casts constituted their own market, distinct from a broader market that might include pro-
fessional football broadcasts, or even sporting event broadcasts generally. See id. Conse-
quently, with the market defined as college football broadcasts, it necessarily followed that 
the NCAA possessed power in this market because the NCAA had complete control over 
these broadcasts. See id. at 112. 
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be found to possess market power.122 Market power acts as “a surrogate 
for detrimental effects” by determining whether the plaintiff has the 
potential to distort competition.123 
 On the other hand, a plaintiff may establish anticompetitive effects 
directly by proving the existence of actual anticompetitive effects, such 
as an increase in price or a reduction in output.124 Where a practice has 
obvious anticompetitive effects, there is no need to prove that the de-
fendant possesses market power because the absence of market power 
does not justify a naked restriction on price or output.125 Accordingly, if 
competitors form an agreement to fix prices, then the anticompetitive 
effects of this behavior are assumed without proof of market power.126 
 If the plaintiff meets this initial burden of establishing anticompet-
itive effects, then the defendant must present some evidence that the 
procompetitive virtues of the conduct outweigh the anticompetitive 
effects.127 Subsequently, if the defendant is able to establish a 
procompetitive justification, the plaintiff then must show that the chal-
lenged conduct is not reasonably necessary or that those objectives can 
be achieved in a substantially less restrictive manner.128 
 In addition to the aforementioned “traditional” rule-of-reason 
analysis, courts have adopted an intermediate analysis, commonly re-
                                                                                                                      
122 See Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460–61; Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 668. 
123 Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460–61. 
124 See id.; Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 668. 
125 See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 109; Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 
U.S. 679, 692–93 (1978) (holding that the canon of ethics prohibiting competitive bidding 
among professional engineers was not justified under the rule of reason and therefore 
violated the Sherman Act). 
126 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 109. 
127 See Nw. Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 294–98 (explaining that although wholesale 
purchasing cooperatives may seem to reduce competition, such arrangements allow partic-
ipants to achieve economies of scale, maintain readily accessible inventories, lower prices, 
and consequently increase competition); Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101–02 (holding that 
some NCAA rules, such as requiring athletes to attend class and to remain unpaid, pre-
serve the unique amateurism within college sports, make the contests more attractive to 
viewers, and consequently increase competition); BMI, 441 U.S. at 18–23 (holding that 
blanket licenses within the music industry may increase efficiency, increase the sellers’ 
aggregate output, and consequently increase competition). 
128 See Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n v. NCAA, 339 F. Supp. 2d 545, 550–51 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (denying summary judgment for a claim alleging that the NCAA’s Postsea-
son Rules regulating college basketball games reduced competition in non-association-
sponsored tournaments in violation of the Sherman Act because the court found genuine 
questions of fact about whether the rules were the least restrictive means of accomplishing 
the NCAA’s goals). 
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ferred to as the “quick-look” rule of reason.129 Courts frequently use 
this method when confronted with a naked market restraint like price-
fixing but find that the typical per se rule is improper under the cir-
cumstances.130 Under the “quick-look” rule of reason, anticompetitive 
effects are assumed if the challenged activity is inherently suspect, but 
the court will not apply the per se rule because there could be potential 
procompetitive justifications for the activity.131 Thus, the court is justi-
fied to proceed directly to the second step of the rule-of-reason analysis 
to evaluate whether the defendant’s procompetitive justifications out-
weigh the anticompetitive effects.132 If the defendant offers legally cog-
nizable procompetitive justifications for the alleged restraint, then the 
court proceeds to the third and final step of the rule-of-reason analy-
sis.133 Here, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate either that 
the challenged restraints are not necessary to achieve the defendant’s 
procompetitive justifications, or that the defendant’s objectives may be 
achieved in a substantially less restrictive manner.134 
B. Antitrust Cases Against the NCAA 
 For the most part, plaintiffs have been unsuccessful in bringing an-
titrust challenges against the NCAA because courts have provided great 
deference to the NCAA to promulgate and enforce the rules it deems 
                                                                                                                      
129 See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 109 (“[W]hen there is an agreement not to compete in 
terms of price or output, no elaborate industry analysis is required to demonstrate the 
anticompetitive character of such an agreement.”); Law, 134 F.3d at 1020 (“[W]here a 
practice has obvious anticompetitive effects . . . . the court is justified in proceeding . . . 
under a ‘quick look’ rule of reason.”). 
130 See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 109–10; Law, 134 F.3d at 1020. 
131 Law, 134 F.3d at 1020; see 7 Philip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust 
Law ¶ 1508 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing the fundamentals of applying the quick-look rule of 
reason); Gary R. Roberts, The NCAA, Antitrust, and Consumer Welfare, 70 Tul. L. Rev. 2631, 
2639 (1996) (explaining that an agreement among horizontal competitors that sets prices 
at a level different from what each would charge in a free market is sufficient evidence of 
anticompetitive conduct). 
132 Law, 134 F.3d at 1020–21. 
133 See Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1997). There are 
certain justifications for anticompetitive conduct that courts will not recognize, such as 
promoting social welfare or protecting the integrity of a learned profession. See Superior 
Trial Court Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 423–24 (holding that a court-appointed lawyers group 
could not avoid liability by arguing that their boycott would help increase the quality of 
representation by increasing pay); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs 435 U.S. at 694–95 (holding 
that a group of engineers could not avoid antitrust liability for a ban on competitive bid-
ding among its members by arguing that competitive bidding among engineers threatens 
the public safety and the integrity of the profession). 
134 Clorox, 117 F.3d at 56. 
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necessary to protect the “amateurism” of college athletics.135 Plaintiffs 
have garnered some recent success, however.136 This Section outlines 
the basis for antitrust claims against the NCAA and then explains the 
reasoning and results of different challenges to the NCAA’s authority.137 
1. The Framework for Antitrust Challenges Against the NCAA 
 Although the Sherman Act, by its plain terms, applies only to 
commercial transactions, the Court has held that the statute was in-
tended to encompass the widest range of conduct.138 Consequently, 
Section 1 of the Act reaches even the activities of nonprofit organiza-
tions, such as universities and the NCAA, because the absence of a prof-
it motive is no guarantee that an entity will act in the best interest of 
consumers.139 Indeed, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
has explicitly held that the payment of financial aid by universities and 
colleges to students can be characterized as a commercial transaction 
and therefore falls within the reach of the Sherman Act.140 
 Courts have consistently applied the rule of reason analysis or the 
“quick look” rule-of-reason analysis when analyzing the rules and regu-
lations of the NCAA.141 Much like the plaintiffs in Maricopa and BMI, 
                                                                                                                      
135 See, e.g., Hairston v. Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1319 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[T]here 
are significant procompetitive effects of punishing football programs that violate . . . ama-
teurism rules.”); Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1090 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he regulations of 
the NCAA were designed to preserve the honesty and integrity of intercollegiate athletics and 
foster fair competition among the participating amateur college students.”); McCormack, 845 
F.2d at 1345 (“That the NCAA has not distilled amateurism to its purest form does not mean 
its attempts to maintain a mixture containing some amateur elements are unreasonable.”). 
136 See Law, 134 F.3d at 1024 (holding an NCAA rule limiting coaches’ salaries unrea-
sonably restrained trade); In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 
1144, 1152 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (denying the NCAA’s motion for summary judgment be-
cause plaintiffs sufficiently alleged anticompetitive effects of NCAA limits on the number 
of athletic scholarships available to each institution); Denial of Defendant’s Motion to 
Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, supra note 15, at 1. 
137 See infra notes 138–185 and accompanying text. 
138 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2006); Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787–88 (1975) 
(“Congress intended to strike as broadly as it could in § 1 of the Sherman Act.”). 
139 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2; Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 666 (holding that the exchange of tui-
tion payments for educational services, even by a nonprofit institution, constitutes a com-
mercial activity covered by the Sherman Act); United States v. Rockford Mem’l Corp., 898 
F.2d 1278, 1285 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that a nonprofit hospital was just as likely to com-
pete as vigorously as profit-making hospitals and therefore a proposed consolidation of 
nonprofit hospitals violated the Sherman Act). 
140 Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 666 (“[T]he payment of tuition in return for educational ser-
vices constitutes commerce.”). 
141 See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117 (refusing to apply a per se analysis to the NCAA’s 
plan for televising college football because rules are essential to the NCAA’s existence); 
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plaintiffs typically have alleged that the NCAA has engaged in literal 
price-fixing since its inception.142 By establishing a set of guidelines and 
hard rules for its member institutions, the NCAA requires universities 
to abide by certain procedures that might be different if universities 
could compete with each other in a free market.143 
 Unlike in Maricopa, however, the courts have declined to condemn 
NCAA rules as per se unlawful.144 Using reasoning similar to that in 
BMI, courts have uniformly rejected applying the per se rule to sports 
associations, including the NCAA.145 For example, in 1984 in NCAA v. 
Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, the U.S. Supreme Court 
analyzed NCAA restrictions limiting the number of football games each 
member institution could televise.146 Although the practice was literally 
horizontal output restriction, the Court declined to condemn it as per 
se illegal because the NCAA must impose certain restrictions to facili-
tate its operations.147 According to the Court, the NCAA markets com-
petition itself, in the form of athletic events, and uniform rules for mat-
ters, such as “the size of the field, the number of players on a team, and 
the extent to which physical violence is to be encouraged or pro-
scribed,” are necessary for effective competition to exist at all.148 Ac-
cordingly, the Court engaged in a rule-of-reason analysis to consider 
the procompetitive justifications of the activity.149 The Court reasoned 
that the NCAA had produced anticompetitive effects by limiting the 
number of televised college football games below the level that would 
be supplied in a free market of single universities acting independent-
                                                                                                                      
Law, 134 F.3d at 1018 (refusing to apply a per se analysis to NCAA regulations limiting the 
compensation for entry-level coaches because certain horizontal restraints are essential to 
the NCAA’s existence); see also supra notes 109–134 and accompanying text (discussing 
rule of reason and “quick-look” rule of reason). 
142 See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 88; Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 332; BMI, 441 U.S. at 4; Se-
cond Amended Complaint for Plaintiff, supra note 14, at 24–26. 
143 See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 113 (“[T]he NCAA television plan on its face consti-
tutes a restraint upon the operation of a free market.”). 
144 See id.; Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 348. 
145 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 98–104 (applying the rule of reason because the NCAA 
needs some restrictions to exist at all); Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 673 
(7th Cir. 1992) (applying the rule of reason because the NBA is a joint venture and re-
quires some restrictions to exist at all); L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F2d 
1381, 1389–91 (9th Cir. 1984) (applying the rule of reason because the NFL needs to im-
plement certain rules in order to function). 
146 See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 88. 
147 Id. at 100–01. 
148 Id. at 101. 
149 Id. at 113. 
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ly.150 Moreover, this limitation did not further a legitimate 
procompetitive justification, such as maintaining competitive balance 
among NCAA member’s football teams.151 In the end, the Court held 
that antitrust laws do in fact regulate the NCAA and that this limitation 
on televising games was illegal.152 
2. Two Defenses: Amateurism and Competitive Balance 
 Although the Board of Regents Court struck down the NCAA regula-
tion of the number of televised games, the ultimate effect of the opin-
ion was to provide the NCAA with a strong legal defense to future anti-
trust suits brought by student-athletes.153 This decision provided the 
NCAA with two specific defenses to antitrust claims: (1) amateurism, 
and (2) competitive balance.154 Regarding amateurism, the Court ex-
plained, in dicta, that the connection between college athletics and ac-
ademics separates college from professional sports.155 Consequently, 
the NCAA was justified in imposing certain rules, such as not paying 
players a market wage, to preserve amateurism in college sports, even 
though these rules would violate antitrust law in other settings.156 Re-
garding competitive balance, the Court explained that healthy compe-
tition among universities was necessary to pique public interest in col-
lege sports.157 Therefore, the Court could assume that most NCAA 
regulations were justifiable because they enhanced competition.158 
                                                                                                                      
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 114–15. 
152 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120. 
153 See id. at 101–02, 117; Chad W. Pekron, The Professional Student-Athlete: Undermining 
Amateurism as an Antitrust Defense in NCAA Compensation Challenges, 24 Hamline L. Rev. 24, 
39 (2000) (identifying dicta in the Board of Regents decision that has had an “unfortunate” 
impact on future litigation against the NCAA). 
154 See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101–02, 117; Pekron, supra note 153, at 39. 
155 See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101–02. In dicta, the Board of Regents Court observed: 
[T]he NCAA seeks to market a particular brand of football—college football. 
The identification of this “product” with an academic tradition differentiates 
college football from and makes it more popular than professional sports to 
which it might be otherwise comparable, such as, for example, minor league 
baseball. In order to preserve the character and quality of the “product,” ath-
letes must not be paid, must be required to attend class, and the like. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
156 See id. 
157 Id. at 117 (“It is reasonable to assume that most of the regulatory controls of the 
NCAA are justifiable means of fostering competition among amateur athletic teams and 
therefore procompetitive because they enhance public interest in collegiate athletics.”). 
158 Id. 
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 Although these defenses were explained in dicta, they still shape 
the landscape for antitrust cases against the NCAA—especially the ama-
teurism defense.159 Courts have used the amateurism defense to hold 
that the NCAA’s compensation limits are per se legal for purposes of 
antitrust law, regardless of any adverse effects on the economic interests 
of student-athletes.160 For example, in 1988 in McCormack v. NCAA, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit deferred to the NCAA’s ama-
teurism defense  when it allowed the NCAA to levy severe sanctions 
against Southern Methodist University for compensating players be-
yond approved limits.161 The court held that the NCAA has the power 
to maintain a system of athletics “containing some amateur elements” 
and thus could not be subject to scrutiny in those areas.162 
 Traditionally, student-athlete plaintiffs have struggled even to  
prove a relevant market for their services in cases involving NCAA regu-
lations because of an adherence to the amateurism defense.163 For ex-
ample, in 1992 in Banks v. NCAA, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit failed to find a relevant market for the services of student-
athletes.164 Banks involved a college football player who challenged the 
NCAA rules prohibiting student-athletes from retaining agents or de-
claring themselves eligible for the NFL Draft.165 The court found that 
the NCAA exists to provide student-athletes with the opportunity to 
pursue academic degrees while simultaneously competing against other 
amateur athletes.166 Ultimately, the court used the procompetitive justi-
fication of amateurism to explain that the plaintiff failed to establish a 
relevant market, which is the first step in the rule-of-reason analysis.167 
                                                                                                                      
159 Id. at 101–02, 117; see Pekron, supra note 153, at 39 (“Many courts have relied on 
the dicta from Board of Regents to decide cases challenging one aspect or another of NCAA 
amateurism rules.”). 
160 See McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1343–45; Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 383 (D. Ariz. 
1983); Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295, 303 (D. Mass. 1975); NCAA Division I Bylaws, 
supra note 3, art. 15; Mitten et al., supra note 37, at 832 (“This body of precedent holds 
that [NCAA amateurism] rules are essentially per se legal for purposes of antitrust law.”). 
161 845 F.2d at 1340. 
162 Id. 
163 See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101–02, 117; Banks, 977 F.2d at 1089–91 (finding no 
relevant market for student-athletes because they were not university employees); Pekron, 
supra note 153, at 39. 
164 977 F.2d at 1089–91. 
165 Id. at 1083–84. 
166 See id. at 1089–90. 
167 See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101–02, 117; Banks, 977 F.2d at 1089–91; see also Jones, 
392 F. Supp. at 303–04 (holding that the plaintiff, a college hockey player challenging 
NCAA eligibility rules, had failed to establish a cognizable market that would be protected 
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 Courts consistently have found markets to exist for certain prod-
ucts or services that are necessary within college athletics.168 For exam-
ple, in 1998 in Law v. NCAA, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit recognized a market for the services of college basketball 
coaches, and held that the NCAA’s compensation restrictions on col-
lege basketball coaches were illegal restraints of trade.169 The Tenth 
Circuit acknowledged that coaches are a necessary part of college 
sports, and universities compete for these coaches’ services.170 There-
fore, the court found that a market for coaches exists in the context of 
collegiate athletics.171 
 Recently, courts have been more willing to recognize a relevant la-
bor market for student-athlete services.172 Most notably, in 2005 in In re 
NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litigation, the U.S. District Court for 
the Western District of Washington found an input market for the ser-
vices of student-athletes.173 This case involved a claim by Division I-A 
walk-on football players that NCAA restrictions on the number of schol-
arships provided to each university prevented these players from receiv-
ing athletics-based financial aid.174 The court determined that schools 
compete with each other for the services of amateur football players, 
who are necessary “inputs” for the production of college football.175 
 Building on the momentum gained by plaintiffs in Walk-On Football 
Players, one group of plaintiffs achieved further success regarding stu-
dent-athlete compensation by putting a new twist on an old argument.176 
                                                                                                                      
by antitrust laws because the eligibility rules were designed to preserve amateurism and 
had no commercial elements). 
168 See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 111; Law, 134 F.3d at 1019–20. 
169 See 134 F.3d at 1019–20, 1024. 
170 See id. at 1019–20. 
171 See id. 
172 See Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that 
NCAA athletic programs do compete in the recruiting of student-athletes but dismissing 
petitioner’s challenge to NCAA transfer rules because petitioner limited the relevant mar-
ket to UCLA instead of all interchangeable schools across the country); Walk-On Football 
Players, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 1150 (finding a relevant input market for the services of student-
athletes). 
173 398 F. Supp. 2d at 1150. An “input” is something that a firm uses to produce a final 
good or service—glass is a necessary input to produce light bulbs, for example. See id. The-
se courts have recognized that student-athletes are inputs in the production of college 
football and that colleges compete with each other for the services of the best student-
athletes. See, e.g., Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1063–64; Walk-On Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1150. 
174 See Walk-On Football Players, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 1146–47. 
175 Id. at 1150; see Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1063–64. 
176 See McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1343–45; Second Amended Complaint for Plaintiff, supra 
note 14, at 3; Mitten et al., supra note 37, at 834. 
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In 2006 in White v. NCAA, the U.S. District Court for the Central District 
of California considered a challenge by a group of former NCAA foot-
ball and men’s basketball players to an NCAA bylaw limiting the maxi-
mum value of their athletic scholarships to the value of tuition, fees, 
room and board, and books.177 The plaintiffs in White established the 
relevant market as U.S. colleges and universities that compete in Major 
College Football and Major College Basketball within the NCAA’s Divi-
sion I.178 
 The plaintiffs carefully drafted the complaint to avoid the NCAA’s 
amateurism defense.179 The plaintiffs could have argued that student-
athletes should be paid wages on top of their scholarships because in a 
free market the top universities would compensate student-athletes far 
above the cost of attendance.180 But, the dicta within the Board of Regents 
decision stated that the NCAA’s amateurism defense would defeat this 
argument—the NCAA cannot pay players a market wage and maintain 
the amateurism that makes college athletics distinctly attractive to con-
sumers.181 Instead, the plaintiffs in White wisely argued that they should 
merely be paid the full cost of attendance.182 By framing the argument 
in this manner, the plaintiff-athletes were not requesting to be paid like 
professional athletes but rather to be given as much aid as students with 
full academic scholarships.183 The plaintiffs intentionally remained 
within Congress’s definition of what constitutes the full cost of attend-
                                                                                                                      
177 Second Amended Complaint for Plaintiff, supra note 14, at 3. 
178 Id. at 10–11. The plaintiffs in White specifically limited the market for football to 
NCAA Division I-A and the market for basketball to NCAA Division I because the NCAA 
itself defines these divisions as the highest level of competition for these sports. Id. at 11–
12. There are no reasonable substitutes for student-athletes to consider and they are 
forced to deal with the NCAA’s restrictions. Id. at 11–13. The plaintiffs argued that univer-
sities within these divisions provide prospective student-athletes with the opportunity to 
compete at the highest level of athletics while obtaining a degree. Id. Furthermore, they 
provide a far greater prospect for advancement to a professional career in athletics than is 
available elsewhere. Id. 
179 See McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1343–45; Second Amended Complaint for Plaintiff, supra 
note 14, at 15; Mitten et al., supra note 37, at 834. 
180 See McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1343–45; Second Amended Complaint for Plaintiff, supra 
note 14, at 15; Mitten et al., supra note 37, at 834. 
181 See 468 U.S. at 101–02. 
182 Compare Second Amended Complaint for Plaintiff, supra note 14, at 15 (claiming 
that student-athletes are entitled to athletics-based aid up to the full cost of attendance), 
with McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1340, 1343–45 (rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that student-
athletes should have no restrictions on compensation and should be paid a market wage). 
183 See Second Amended Complaint for Plaintiff, supra note 14, at 15; Dennie, supra 
note 63, at 119 (“White poses a different query. The White class attempts to remain within 
the confines of federal financial aid policies as established by federal regulations.”). 
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ance.184 Consequently, the NCAA could not argue that this increase in 
pay would undermine amateurism because the student-athletes would 
only be receiving money for the costs of being a student and nothing 
more.185 
III. The New Miscellaneous Expense Allowance Leaves  
the NCAA Vulnerable to Antitrust Suits 
 The NCAA’s Miscellaneous Expense Allowance (“MEA”) attempt-
ed to fill the gap in student-athletes’ financial aid that served as the ba-
sis for the complaint filed in 2006 in White v. NCAA.186 The new regula-
tion, if passed, would only partially fill this gap, however.187 The NCAA 
would simply be raising the cap on athletics-based aid without address-
ing the price-fixing behavior at issue in White.188 By using the framework 
established by the plaintiffs in White, a group of student-athletes could 
challenge the $2000 cap on miscellaneous expenses and receive finan-
cial aid up to the full cost of attendance.189 
 The MEA is a paradigmatic example of horizontal price-fixing.190 
Courts have consistently refused to condemn NCAA regulations as per 
                                                                                                                      
184 McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1343–45; Second Amended Complaint for Plaintiff, supra 
note 14, at 15; see Dennie, supra note 63, at 119. 
185 McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1343–45; Second Amended Complaint for Plaintiff, supra 
note 14, at 15; see Dennie, supra note 63, at 119. Although the court ruled that the plain-
tiffs’ complaint sufficiently alleged an anticompetitive agreement among NCAA member 
universities to fix the economic value of their athletic scholarships, the case was settled 
before trial. Denial of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, su-
pra note 15, at 1; Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, supra note 17, at 2. Pursuant to 
the terms of the settlement, the NCAA provided a total of $218 million to Division I insti-
tutions to give aid to current student-athletes with financial needs, academic needs, or 
both, and established a $10 million fund to reimburse plaintiffs’ future education expens-
es. Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, supra note 17, at 10–11. This settlement, 
however, does not preclude future antitrust litigation. See id.; Mitten et al., supra note 37, at 
834. 
186 Second Amended Complaint for Plaintiff, supra note 14, at 3 (plaintiffs estimated 
that students on “full” athletic scholarships must cover $2500 per year in miscellaneous 
living expenses); see Hosick, supra note 9. 
187 See Second Amended Complaint for Plaintiff, supra note 14, at 3; Coll. Bd., supra 
note 8, at 6 fig.1 (according to the College Board, the average amount spent by students 
on miscellaneous expenses is approximately $3200 per year at public universities and 
$2500 per year at private universities); Hosick, supra note 9 (allowing NCAA member 
schools to grant student-athletes up to $2000 per year to cover miscellaneous expenses). 
188 See Second Amended Complaint for Plaintiff, supra note 14, at 3; Hosick, supra note 9. 
189 See Second Amended Complaint for Plaintiff, supra note 14, at 10–15; infra notes 
196–302 and accompanying text. 
190 See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 117 (1984); McCormack 
v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1343–45 (5th Cir. 1988). 
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se antitrust violations, however, and thus a court interpreting this hypo-
thetical claim would most likely apply the rule of reason.191 This Part 
walks through a rule-of-reason analysis for a hypothetical claim by a class 
of current and former student-athletes (“claimants”) challenging the 
NCAA’s cap on athletics-based financial aid.192 Section A examines indi-
rect and direct proof of the MEA’s anticompetitive effects.193 Section B 
then analyzes possible procompetitive justifications for the MEA.194 Fi-
nally, Section C considers less restrictive alternatives to the MEA.195 
A. The Anticompetitive Effects of the Miscellaneous Expense Allowance 
 Under the rule of reason, a plaintiff must first prove that the de-
fendant’s conduct created an anticompetitive effect.196 A plaintiff can 
establish anticompetitive effects indirectly, by proving “market power,” 
or directly, by proving the anticompetitive effects of the defendant’s 
actions.197 Proving market power requires the plaintiff to: (1) define 
the relevant market, and (2) show the defendant’s power in the market 
through a lack of reasonable alternatives.198 Alternatively, a plaintiff can 
directly prove anticompetitive effects caused by the defendant’s con-
duct if the conduct is a naked restraint on trade.199 The claimants could 
establish anticompetitive effects both indirectly and directly in this 
case.200 
1. Indirect Proof Through Market Power 
a. Does a Market Exist for Student Athletes 
 As in White, the claimants should argue that the relevant market is 
the input market for the services of student-athletes at U.S. colleges 
and universities within Major College Football and Major College Bas-
                                                                                                                      
191 See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117; Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1017–18 (10th Cir. 
1998); McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1343–45. 
192 See infra notes 196–302 and accompanying text. 
193 See infra notes 196–252 and accompanying text. 
194 See infra notes 253–291 and accompanying text. 
195 See infra notes 292–302 and accompanying text. 
196 United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993); see supra notes 110–134 
and accompanying text. 
197 See FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460–61 (1986); Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 
668; supra notes 115–128 and accompanying text. 
198 See Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460–61; Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 668. 
199 See Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 668; Baker et al., supra note 70, at 80; Dennie, supra note 
63, at 112. 
200 See infra notes 201–252 and accompanying text. 
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ketball.201 In other words, the claimants should argue that universities 
compete with each other for the services of the best student-athletes by 
recruiting them with athletic scholarships.202 
 Courts have changed course in the last twenty years and have be-
gun to recognize a market for student-athletes.203 Although only two 
courts have found that an input market for student-athletes exists, oth-
er courts have tackled this question in analogous situations.204 Courts 
have explained that college athletics is a business with certain inputs 
that are necessary for its existence.205 Most comparably, in 1998 in Law 
v. NCAA, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recognized a 
market for the services of college basketball coaches, and held that the 
NCAA’s compensation restrictions on college basketball coaches were 
illegal restraints of trade.206 Student-athletes, like coaches, are necessary 
for college athletics to exist, and therefore a court would likely find that 
a market exists for their services.207 
 The NCAA would likely argue that it exists to provide student-
athletes with academic degrees along with athletic competition, not 
merely to provide student-athletes with compensation for their athletic 
services.208 NCAA student-athletes are students first and athletes se-
cond—that is, they are not hired guns brought in by universities to raise 
revenues.209 Thus, the NCAA will likely use the amateurism defense to 
argue that no market exists for the services of student-athletes.210 
                                                                                                                      
201 See Second Amended Complaint for Plaintiff, supra note 14, at 10–11; see also In re 
Walk-On Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1150 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (finding a 
relevant input market for the services of student-athletes). 
202 See Walk-On Football Players, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 1150; Second Amended Complaint 
for Plaintiff, supra note 14, at 10–11. 
203 Compare Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding 
an input market for student-athletes because universities do compete with each other in 
recruiting), and Walk-On Football Players, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 1150 (finding an input market 
for the services of student-athletes), with Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1089 (7th Cir. 
1992) (finding no relevant market for the services of student-athletes because they were 
not employees of the university), and Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295, 303 (D. Mass. 1975) 
(finding no relevant market for student-athletes because they were not traditional busi-
nessmen). 
204 See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S at 111; Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1063–64; Law, 134 F.3d at 
1019–20; Walk-On Football Players, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 1150. 
205 See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S at 111; Law, 134 F.3d at 1019–20. 
206 See Law, 134 F.3d at 1019–20, 1024; Dennie, supra note 63, at 112. 
207 See Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1063–64; Law, 134 F.3d at 1019–20; Walk-On Football Players, 
398 F. Supp. 2d at 1150. 
208 See Banks, 977 F.2d at 1089; Jones, 392 F. Supp. at 303. 
209 See Banks, 977 F.2d at 1089; Jones, 392 F. Supp. at 303. 
210 See Banks, 977 F.2d at 1089; Jones, 392 F. Supp. at 303. 
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 A court would likely find a relevant input market for the services of 
student-athletes because of the economic realities pervading the land-
scape of college sports.211 Major college football and basketball pro-
grams generate tens of millions of dollars for their universities.212 As the 
courts in In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litigation and Tanaka v. 
University of Southern California have recognized, student-athletes are 
necessary inputs to create these products.213 Universities with major 
football and basketball programs offer financial compensation, in the 
form of athletic scholarships, to recruit the best athletes and generate 
the most profit.214 Therefore, a court would likely find that an input 
market exists for the services of student-athletes.215 
b. Establishing Market Power 
 After defining the relevant market, a plaintiff must demonstrate 
that the defendant has market power by showing a lack of reasonable 
alternatives to the defendant’s services.216 Once the market is defined 
as the input market for the services of student-athletes, it becomes evi-
dent that no reasonable alternatives exist.217 The colleges and universi-
ties that compete in Major College Football and Major College Basket-
ball are the only institutions willing to provide financial aid to student-
athletes and still allow them to play athletics at the highest level.218 
                                                                                                                      
211 See Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1063–64; Walk-On Football Players, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 1150; 
Second Amended Complaint for Plaintiff, supra note 14, at 10–15; see also Walter Byers, 
Unsportsmanlike Conduct: Exploiting College Athletes 7–13 (1995) (arguing that, 
given the explosive growth of college athletics, student-athletes should be paid above the 
full grant-in-aid); Branch, supra note 47, at 82 (“With so many people paying for tickets 
and watching on television, college sports has become Very Big Business.”); supra notes 31–
57 and accompanying text (discussing the economics of college sports and the resulting 
scandals). 
212 See Joe Nocera, Let’s Start Paying College Athletes, N.Y. Times (Dec. 30, 2011) (maga-
zine), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/01/magazine/lets-start-paying-college-athletes. 
html (explaining that college football and men’s basketball generate more than $6 billion 
in annual revenue, but that players cannot receive as much financial aid as a student re-
ceiving a full academic scholarship). 
213 Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1063–64; Walk-On Football Players, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 1150. 
214 See Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1063–64; Walk-On Football Players, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 1150; 
Second Amended Complaint for Plaintiff, supra note 14, at 13–15. 
215 See Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1063–64; Walk-On Football Players, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 1150; 
Baker et al., supra note 70, at 86; Dennie, supra note 63, at 112–13. 
216 See supra notes 119–122 and accompanying text. 
217 See Walk-On Football Players, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 1150 (“[T]here are no other viable op-
tions for students wishing to make full use of their skills at the highest level of competition.”). 
218 See Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1063–64; Walk-On Football Players, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 1150; 
Second Amended Complaint for Plaintiff, supra note 14, at 14–15; Baker et al., supra note 
70, at 86. 
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Theoretically, if the NCAA wanted to decrease the amount of athletics-
based aid to student-athletes, student-athletes would have no alternative 
buyers and would be at the mercy of the NCAA.219 
 Ivy Group institutions are not alternatives because they only pro-
vide academic scholarships, not athletic scholarships, and they there-
fore cannot recruit the services of student-athletes through financial 
aid awards.220 Similarly, military academies are not alternatives because 
they also do not provide student-athletes with athletic scholarships— 
these academies provide all students with full scholarships and stipends 
in exchange for military service after graduation.221 Although these in-
stitutions field teams that compete with the schools in Major College 
Football and Major College Basketball, they do not represent a reason-
able alternative to NCAA institutions because they do not offer com-
pensation for the services of student-athletes, but rather for academic 
or military service.222 
 Nor does access to other forms of financial aid unrelated to athlet-
ic ability constitute a reasonable alternative.223 By definition, these 
forms of financial aid do not compensate student-athletes for athletic 
service.224 They do not present student-athletes with an opportunity to 
exchange their services for financial compensation, and therefore they 
are not reasonable alternatives to athletic scholarships.225 
 Additionally, professional sports leagues are not reasonable alter-
natives for student-athletes to receive additional financial aid.226 As the 
Supreme Court observed in 1984 in NCAA v. Board of Regents, profes-
sional sports are inherently distinct from collegiate athletics because of 
                                                                                                                      
219 See supra notes 119–122 and accompanying text (discussing the market definition 
procedure under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines). 
220 Prospective Student-Athlete Information, Ivy League, http://www.ivyleaguesports.com/ 
information/psa/index (last visited May. 15, 2013) (noting that Ivy Group institutions only 
offer financial aid based on need, not based on academics or athletics). 
221 United States Military Academy, StateUniversity.com, http://www.stateuniversity. 
com/universities/NY/United_States_Military_Academy.html (last visited May 15, 2013) 
(noting that military academies provide all students with full scholarships in exchange for 
five years of military service). 
222 See id. 
223 See Federal Pell Grant Program, supra note 63; Student-Athlete Benefits, supra note 9. 
224 See Federal Pell Grant Program, supra note 63; Student-Athlete Benefits, supra note 9. 
225 See Federal Pell Grant Program, supra note 63; Student-Athlete Benefits, supra note 9. Alt-
hough these programs would not represent reasonable alternatives for the services of stu-
dent-athletes, they would potentially lower the amount of damages. See Federal Pell Grant Pro-
gram, supra note 63; Student-Athlete Benefits, supra note 9. 
226 See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101–02; NCAA Division I Bylaws, supra note 3, art. 
12.1; Dennie, supra note 63, at 113 (“It is disingenuous for the NCAA to argue that a pro-
fessional market is a reasonable substitute for amateur athletics.”). 
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the unique nature and appeal of amateur athletics.227 Thus, it would be 
hypocritical for the NCAA to argue that it is necessary to not pay play-
ers in order to preserve amateurism while simultaneously arguing that 
professional athletics would be an alternative, if not interchangeable, 
experience.228 If the distinction between amateur collegiate athletics 
and professional athletics is what makes college sports so attractive, 
then professional sports must be considered an entirely different prod-
uct.229 The NCAA cannot have it both ways; either amateur college ath-
letics is something unique for which professional athletics would not be 
a reasonable alternative, or college athletics is not special and unique 
and there is no reason to limit the compensation awarded to student-
athletes.230 
 Moreover, both the National Football League (NFL) and National 
Basketball Association (NBA) do not allow players to join the league 
directly from high school. 231 This essentially forces many athletes to 
play in college before having a chance to reap the financial rewards of 
professional athletics.232 Even if a student-athlete wanted to seek profes-
sional athletics as an alternative, he could not do so directly out of high 
school, and therefore these professional leagues are not a reasonable 
alternative to student-athletes graduating from high school.233 
                                                                                                                      
227 See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101–02. 
228 See id. at 102; McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1344–45. 
229 See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102; McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1344 (“The NCAA markets 
college football as a product distinct from professional football.”). 
230 See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102; McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1344–45; Dennie, supra 
note 63, at 113–14. 
231 Nat’l Football League & NFL Players Ass’n, Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment art. 6, § 2(b) (2011) [hereinafter NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement] (re-
quiring NFL players to wait at least three years after graduating high school to become 
eligible, but not explicitly requiring that students play in college); Nat’l Basketball 
Ass’n & Nat’l Basketball Players Ass’n, Collective Bargaining Agreement art. X, 
§ 1(b)(i) (2011) [hereinafter NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement] (requiring NBA 
players to be at least nineteen years old and to have had at least one NBA season elapsed 
since the player’s graduation from high school). 
232 See Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 125–26 (2d Cir. 2004) (upholding 
the NFL’s eligibility rules and not allowing Ohio State running back Maurice Clarett to 
declare for the NFL Draft after his freshman season); NBA Collective Bargaining 
Agreement, supra note 231, art. X, § 1(b)(i); NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, 
supra note 231, art. 6, § 2(b). 
233 See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 125–26; NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra 
note 231, art. X, § 1(b)(i); NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 231, art. 
6, § 2(b). Interestingly, some American basketball players have begun to offer their ser-
vices overseas as an alternative to college athletics. See Chris Broussard, Exchange Student, 
ESPN Mag., Oct. 5, 2009, at 85, 86. Thus, there may be an alternative market for profes-
sional basketball players overseas, and therefore the claimants should limit the geographic 
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2. Direct Proof of Anticompetitive Effects 
 Alternatively, the claimants could offer direct proof of the MEA’s 
anticompetitive effects.234 Although the new MEA raises the ceiling, it is 
still a cap on athletics-based financial aid.235 As explained in 1993 by the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in United States v. Brown 
University, artificial caps placed on financial aid put a restraint on com-
petitive bidding among different universities.236 In turn, this deprives 
prospective students of the ability to receive higher financial aid pack-
ages when selecting a college or university.237 The NCAA is a cartel that 
limits competition between universities for the valuable services of stu-
dent-athletes.238 And the NCAA has developed monopsony power239 
over the input market for student-athletes, which it has used to create a 
horizontal price restraint on athletics-based financial aid.240 By imple-
menting rules that limit competition for the services of student-
athletes, universities reduce their transactional costs to produce sport-
ing events, which in turn generates tens of millions of dollars in reve-
nue.241 The claimants should argue that without any artificial cap, some 
institutions would offer student-athletes financial aid that would cover 
                                                                                                                      
market to the United States. See Second Amended Complaint for Plaintiff, supra note 14, at 
15; Broussard, supra, at 86. 
234 See Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 668; Hosick, supra note 9. 
235 See Hosick, supra note 9; supra notes 66–77 and accompanying text. 
236 5 F.3d at 673 (holding that the agreement between Ivy League Schools to coordi-
nate financial offerings to students restrained competitive bidding and deprived the stu-
dents of the opportunity to compare offerings among schools in an open market); see Se-
cond Amended Complaint for Plaintiff, supra note 14, at 14. 
237 See Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 673; Second Amended Complaint for Plaintiff, supra note 
14, at 14. 
238 See Dennie, supra note 63, at 114 (“In effect, the NCAA is a cartel that eliminates 
price competition among its member institutions in competition for a limited supply of 
talented inputs (student-athletes).”); Lee Goldman, Sports and Antitrust: Should College Stu-
dents Be Paid to Play?, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 206, 226–27, 229 (1990) (detailing how the 
NCAA has established a cartel that controls the compensation of student-athletes). 
239 A “monopsony” is a market condition when one buyer faces multiple sellers. See 2A 
Philip E. Areeda et al., Antitrust Law ¶ 395e (3d ed. 2007) (explaining the mechanics 
of collusive monopsonies). The monopsonist may dictate terms to its suppliers in the same 
way that a monopolist may dictate terms to its buyers. See Walk-On Football Players, 398 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1151 n.4. 
240 See NCAA Division I Bylaws, supra note 3, art. 15.1; Dennie, supra note 63, at 114 
(“The NCAA has developed complete monopsony power over the student-athlete input 
market . . . .”); Goldman, supra note 238, at 227 (“The NCAA has almost complete monop-
sony power over the student-athlete labor market . . . .”). 
241 See Mitten et al., supra note 37, at 833; Branch, supra note 47, at 82. 
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the full cost of attendance—the same amount that universities can offer 
students with full academic scholarships.242 
 Although the MEA raises the ceiling by $2000, this does not quite 
fill the gap for student-athletes attending universities where the average 
personal and miscellaneous expenses exceed $2000.243 For a student-
athlete at the University of Michigan, which calculates the cost of un-
dergraduate students’ personal and miscellaneous expenses to be $2054 
per year, the $2000 limitation imposed by the NCAA would be nearly 
sufficient to achieve parity with a full academic scholarship.244 Thus, if 
Michigan could implement the MEA, its student-athletes would suffer 
only negligible harm.245 
 By contrast, for a student-athlete at Clemson University, which cal-
culates the cost of undergraduate students’ personal and miscellaneous 
expenses to be approximately $3700 per year, the $2000 cap would 
have serious ramifications.246 Clemson would be limited to granting 
$2000 of additional athletics-based aid to its student-athletes, which 
would cover slightly more than half of the students’ additional living 
expenses.247 Thus, the MEA would put student-athletes at schools locat-
ed in areas with high costs of living, such as those at Clemson, at a sig-
nificant disadvantage in terms of possible financial aid packages.248 
 Because the MEA imposes a burden on student-athletes at univer-
sities with higher costs of living, the claimants should be able to estab-
lish anticompetitive effects and damages.249 For student-athletes attend-
ing universities where personal and miscellaneous expenses exceed 
$2000, the MEA prevents them from receiving the compensation they 
would receive in a competitive market.250 Indeed, if the NCAA allowed 
it, some university administrators would likely provide athletic scholar-
                                                                                                                      
242 See 20 U.S.C. § 108711(1)–(3) (2006); Second Amended Complaint for Plaintiff, 
supra note 14, at 15; NCAA Division I Bylaws, supra note 3, art. 15.1. 
243 See Hosick, supra note 9; infra notes 244–252 and accompanying text. 
244 Cost to Attend U-M, Univ. of Mich., http://www.finaid.umich.edu/TopNav/About 
UMFinancialAid/CostofAttendance.aspx (last visited May 15, 2013) [hereinafter Michigan 
COA]; see Hosick, supra note 9. 
245 See Hosick, supra note 9; Michigan COA, supra note 244. 
246 Estimated Cost of Attendance, Clemson, http://www.clemson.edu/financial-aid/costs/ 
COA.html (last visited May 15, 2013) [hereinafter Clemson COA]; see Hosick, supra note 9. 
247 See Hosick, supra note 9; Clemson COA, supra note 246. 
248 See Hosick, supra note 9; Clemson COA, supra note 246; Michigan COA, supra note 
244. 
249 See Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 673 (holding that agreements among universities to set 
limits on financial aid offerings create anticompetitive effects); Hosick, supra note 9; Clem-
son COA, supra note 246; Michigan COA, supra note 244. 
250 See Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 673; Second Amended Complaint for Plaintiff, supra note 
14, at 3; Hosick, supra note 9; Clemson COA, supra note 246. 
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ships up to the full cost of attendance.251 Therefore, the MEA sets a lim-
it to student-athlete compensation below that which would prevail in a 
free market, and thus creates anticompetitive harm.252 
B. The Procompetitive Justifications of the Miscellaneous Expense Allowance 
 In a rule-of-reason antitrust case, once the plaintiff has established 
an anticompetitive effect in the relevant market, the burden shifts to 
the defendant to offer a legally cognizable procompetitive justification 
for the restraint.253 Simply put, the defendant has the opportunity to 
give good reasons for implementing a particular restraint.254 The NCAA 
has consistently raised two arguments to defend itself against antitrust 
claims—preserving amateurism and maintaining competitive equity.255 
Consequently, it is likely that the NCAA will raise both these defenses in 
potential MEA litigation.256 This Section addresses both arguments in 
the context of a challenge to the MEA.257 
                                                                                                                      
251 See Interview with Carlene Pariseau, Assoc. Athletics Dir. for Compliance, Boston 
College Athletic Dep’t, & Robert Taggart, Professor of Finance, Carroll School of Mgmt. 
and Faculty Athletic Representative for Boston College, in Chestnut Hill, Mass. (Feb. 29, 
2012) (on file with author). Robert Taggart, the Faculty Athletic Representative for Boston 
College, explained that if the MEA passed “then the schools in the BCS Conferences, just 
to take a set, will probably pretty much all go along because they will want to compete. The 
ones for whom it is tough will just bite the bullet and just do it.” Id. 
252 See Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 673; Second Amended Complaint for Plaintiff, supra note 
14, at 3; Hosick, supra note 9. 
253 See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 113 (“[H]allmarks of anticompetitive behavior place 
upon petitioner a heavy burden of establishing an affirmative defense which competitively 
justifies this apparent deviation from the free market.”); see also note 133 (discussing social 
welfare justifications). 
254 See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 113. 
255 See, e.g., id. at 101–02 (accepting the NCAA’s argument that in order to preserve ama-
teurism in college athletics, student-athletes cannot be paid); id. at 117 (accepting the 
NCAA’s argument that it is “reasonable to assume” that most NCAA regulations are “justifia-
ble means of fostering competition among amateur athletic teams”); Law, 134 F.3d at 1023–
24 (rejecting the NCAA’s argument that NCAA regulations concerning salary restrictions 
placed on entry-level coaches were designed to promote competitive equity); McCormack, 845 
F.2d at 1343–45 (accepting the NCAA’s argument that the NCAA has the power to maintain a 
system of athletics “containing some amateur elements”). 
256 See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101–02; Law, 134 F.3d at 1023–24; McCormack, 845 F.2d 
at 1343–45. 
257 See infra notes 258–291 and accompanying text. 
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1. Still Operating Within Amateurism 
 The claimants can argue that the court could still recognize the 
NCAA’s amateurism defense, but allow antitrust law to operate within 
the artificial limits imposed by the full cost of attendance.258 
 The claimants can argue that a limit on athletics-based financial 
aid below the full cost of attendance is similar to the rule in Walk-On 
Football Players and nearly identical to the rule in White.259 The MEA 
gives colleges the ability to grant students extra financial compensation 
for miscellaneous and personal items.260 The $2000 limit, however, for-
bids some student-athletes from receiving the full cost of attendance.261 
If the NCAA were to allow some student-athletes to receive the full cost 
of attendance, then it would be illogical for the NCAA to then argue 
that it would destroy amateurism to provide all student-athletes with 
compensation up to the full cost of attendance.262 If a student-athlete at 
Clemson University, for example, were to receive $3700 in miscellane-
ous expenses, then this athlete would still be within the limitations es-
tablished by Congress and would be no less an amateur than if the ath-
lete received $2000.263 Therefore, the claimants could argue that 
exchanging the $2000 cap imposed by the MEA for the full cost of at-
tendance will simultaneously preserve amateurism and accomplish the 
goals of antitrust law.264 
                                                                                                                      
258 See 20 U.S.C. § 108711 (2006); Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101–02; McCormack, 845 
F.2d at 1344–45; Baker et al., supra note 70, at 92; Dennie, supra note 63, at 119; Hosick, 
supra note 9. 
259 See Walk-On Football Players, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 1149 (reasoning that the NCAA rule 
artificially restricting the number of football scholarships allowed at each school was de-
signed to cut costs for universities and not to preserve amateurism); Second Amended 
Complaint for Plaintiff, supra note 14 (arguing that the NCAA’s grant-in-aid limitation cuts 
costs for universities and prevents student-athletes from being compensated up to the full 
cost of attendance). 
260 See Hosick, supra note 9. 
261 See id. (explaining that the MEA gives student-athletes “the opportunity to receive 
additional athletics aid up to the full cost of attendance or $2,000, whichever is less.”); 
Clemson COA, supra note 246 (calculating the average Clemson undergraduate student’s 
miscellaneous expenses to be approximately $4400 per year). 
262 See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101–02; McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1344–45; Baker et al., 
supra note 70, at 92; Dennie, supra note 63, at 119; Hosick, supra note 9. 
263 See 20 U.S.C. § 108711 (2006); Clemson COA, supra note 246; see also supra notes 243–
248 (explaining how the different costs of attendance at the University of Michigan and 
the University of Clemson would result in unfair treatment of some students under the 
MEA). 
264 See Walk-On Football Players, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 1149 (holding that an increased avail-
ability of scholarships for schools to give to student-athletes would preserve amateurism 
and better serve the goals of antitrust law). 
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 The NCAA could successfully establish an amateurism defense by 
arguing that the MEA falls within a category of cost-cutting regulations 
that are inherently designed to promote amateurism—rules limiting the 
amount of compensation available to individual student-athletes.265 In 
1988 in McCormack v. NCAA, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Cir-
cuit was willing to recognize the NCAA’s amateurism defense when a 
group of student-athletes at Southern Methodist University (SMU) chal-
lenged the NCAA’s sanction of SMU for compensating players beyond 
approved limits.266 Applying dicta from the Board of Regents decision, the 
court held that although cutting costs was a byproduct of the “cap on 
compensation” rule, the rule was necessary to preserve amateurism 
within college athletics.267 By extending the rationale of McCormack, the 
NCAA could argue that all “cap on compensation” rules, including the 
new MEA, are designed to promote amateurism.268 
 The NCAA can further strengthen its position by distinguishing 
the MEA from the regulation in one particularly unfavorable case.269 In 
2005 in In re NCAA Walk-On Players Litigation, the U.S. District Court for 
the Western District of Washington was unwilling to recognize the 
NCAA’s amateurism defense for a regulation that limited the number 
of athletic scholarships available at each university.270 The “total schol-
arships” rule regulated the total amount of scholarships available at 
each school and not the amount of compensation provided within the 
scholarships.271 The court found that this rule was aimed at cutting 
costs for universities, not promoting amateurism.272 Providing more 
scholarships would not undermine amateurism, but providing more 
compensation to each student-athlete could undermine amateurism.273 
Unlike the “total scholarships” rule, the MEA does fall into the category 
of regulations limiting the amount of compensation to student-athletes 
and thus a court could recognize the NCAA’s amateurism defense.274 
                                                                                                                      
265 See McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1340, 1343–45; supra notes 153–162 (explaining the ori-
gins of the amateurism defense). 
266 See McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1344–45. 
267 See id. (citing Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102). 
268 See id.; Hosick, supra note 9. 
269 See In re NCAA Walk-On Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d at 1149; supra notes 172–175 
and accompanying text. 
270 See In re NCAA Walk-On Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d at 1149. 
271 See id. 
272 See id. 
273 See McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1343–45; In re NCAA Walk-On Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1149. 
274 See In re NCAA Walk-On Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d at 1149; Hosick, supra note 9. 
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 This appears to be the NCAA’s strongest argument, and a court 
might accept it.275 If the court does not accept this argument, however, 
it will likely rule that the MEA’s cap on athletics-based aid is designed to 
cut costs, which is not a valid procompetitive justification.276 
2. Maintaining Competitive Equity 
 Alternatively, the NCAA could argue that the MEA was designed to 
maintain competitive equity in college athletics.277 The NCAA has re-
peatedly argued in antitrust cases that particular regulations are de-
signed to level the playing field by limiting the amount of funds used by 
member institutions on athletics programs.278 
 Although these concerns might be legitimate, courts have been 
unwilling to accept this justification without evidence from the NCAA 
that competitive equity was the main justification supporting a rule’s 
adoption.279 In Board of Regents, the Court observed that most NCAA 
rules are likely intended to foster competition; the Court dismissed this 
justification, however, because the NCAA offered no evidence that the 
plan restricting television broadcasts was intended to level the playing 
field in college football.280 Similarly, in Law, the Tenth Circuit reasoned 
that the NCAA salary restrictions on entry-level coaches were not de-
signed to equalize the strength of intercollegiate athletic teams because 
there was no evidence that the regulation at issue actually equalized 
competition.281 Rather, the court held that the salary restrictions were 
merely structured to avoid exacerbating any existing competitive im-
balance.282 
 Based on the reasoning in Board of Regents and Law, the NCAA 
must show that its rule was designed to promote competitive equity, not 
                                                                                                                      
275 See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101–02; McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1343–45; Hosick, supra 
note 9. 
276 See Law, 134 F.3d at 1022 (“[C]ost-cutting by itself is not a valid procompetitive justi-
fication.”); Walk-On Football Players, 398 F. Supp. 2d. at 1149; Hosick, supra note 9. 
277 See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 119 (rejecting the NCAA’s argument that the plan re-
stricting television broadcasts was designed to enhance competitive equity); Law, 134 F.3d 
at 1024 (rejecting the NCAA’s argument that rules limiting compensation for entry-level 
coaches were designed to promote competition). 
278 See, e.g., Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 119; Law, 134 F.3d at 1024. 
279 See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117–19; Law, 134 F.3d at 1024. 
280 468 U.S. at 119. The Court noted that there was no evidence that the restriction of 
television broadcasts would promote equality more so than rules regarding alumni dona-
tions, tuition rates, or other revenue-producing activities. See id. 
281 134 F.3d at 1024. 
282 Id. (“[T]he only consideration the NCAA gave to competitive balance was simply to 
structure the rule so as not to exacerbate competitive imbalance.”). 
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merely to limit inequity that already exists.283 The NCAA’s strongest ar-
gument on this point is that an artificial cap is necessary because with-
out some cap, universities might artificially inflate their cost of attend-
ance to increase the amount that they could provide to student-
athletes.284 Consequently, a school like the University of Texas could 
increase its estimate for miscellaneous expenses in order to offer more 
money in athletic scholarships, and thereby gain a competitive ad-
vantage.285 
 This argument would most likely fail, however.286 When the legisla-
tion was passed in October 2011, there was no indication that the MEA 
was designed to promote competitive balance.287 There is currently no 
evidence that the MEA will have any influence on competitive bal-
ance.288 For instance, the MEA would permit some universities to pay 
an additional $2000 to hundreds of student-athletes that other universi-
ties simply cannot afford.289 This, in turn, could create recruiting ad-
vantages for universities with larger budgets, ultimately making the rich 
richer and the poor poorer.290 Until the NCAA submits evidence that 
the MEA will actually improve competitive balance, a court will most 
likely reject this potential procompetitive justification.291 
C. Less Restrictive Alternatives to the Miscellaneous Expense Allowance 
 The third and final step in the rule-of-reason analysis is only neces-
sary if the defendant succeeds in convincing the court that the 
                                                                                                                      
283 See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 119; Law, 134 F.3d at 1024. 
284 See Hosick, supra note 9; Interview with Pariseau & Taggart, supra note 251 (explain-
ing that a major reason the NCAA created the $2000 limitation was “because there was 
concern that institutions would all of a sudden inflate the cost of attendance, and some 
institutions would have five, six thousand dollar costs of attendance”). 
285 See Hosick, supra note 9; Interview with Pariseau & Taggart, supra note 251. 
286 See Hosick, supra note 9; Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 119; Law, 134 F.3d at 1024. 
287 See Hosick, supra note 9; Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117–19; Law, 134 F.3d at 1024 
(“Nowhere does the NCAA prove that the salary restrictions enhance competition, level an 
uneven playing field, or reduce coaching inequities.”). 
288 See Hosick, supra note 9; Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117–19; Law, 134 F.3d at 1024. In 
fact, the MEA will likely worsen competitive balance within the NCAA if it has any effect at all. 
See Ivan Maisel, Full Cost of Attendance Gains Traction, ESPN ( July 14, 2011), http://espn.go. 
com/college-sports/story/_/id/6765762/full-cost-attendance-student-athletes-gaining-trac- 
tion; Interview with Pariseau & Taggart, supra note 251. 
289 See Maisel, supra note 288; Interview with Pariseau & Taggart, supra note 251. Rob-
ert Taggart, the Faculty Athletic Representative for Boston College, emphasized that “for 
schools that don’t have that kind of revenue, they are going to have a hard time compet-
ing, and those are just the facts.” Interview with Pariseau & Taggart, supra note 251. 
290 See Maisel, supra note 288; Interview with Pariseau & Taggart, supra note 251. 
291 See Hosick, supra note 9; Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 119; Law, 134 F.3d at 1024. 
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procompetitive justification creates a net benefit beyond the harms 
caused by the anticompetitive conduct.292 At this step, the burden shifts 
back to the plaintiff to prove that the defendant could accomplish its 
objectives in a less restrictive manner.293 
 If a court were to accept the NCAA’s amateurism defense, then the 
claimants should argue that raising the MEA’s limit to the full cost of 
attendance would be a less restrictive alternative.294 This argument is 
the same as the argument against applying the amateurism defense to 
the MEA.295 If student-athletes received the full cost of attendance then 
amateurism would still be fully maintained, but this would be a less re-
strictive alternative because student-athletes would receive higher 
amounts of athletics-based compensation.296 Consequently, a court 
would likely hold that a limit set at the full cost of attendance for each 
institution would be less restrictive than the MEA’s artificial $2000 
cap.297 
 If a court were to accept the NCAA’s competitive equity justifica-
tion, then the claimants should argue that the NCAA could set the cap 
at the full cost of attendance and then simply impose sanctions on 
schools that artificially inflate their cost of attendance.298 This system 
would accomplish the same goals as the artificial cap because schools 
would be deterred from granting impermissible benefits .299 By setting a 
cap at the full cost of attendance, it would be possible for a university’s 
financial aid office to inflate the cost of attendance, but the threat of 
                                                                                                                      
292 Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1997). 
293 White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 270 (1963) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) (stating that the less restrictive alternative test is relevant to the rule-of-reason analy-
sis because it requires the court to determine if the restraint is “more restrictive than nec-
essary, or excessively anticompetitive, when viewed in light of the extenuating interests”); 
see Baker et al., supra note 70, at 93 (explaining that Justice William J. Brennan’s concur-
ring opinion in White Motor Co. v. United States provides one of the best arguments for the 
less restrictive alternative test). 
294 See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101–02; McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1343–45; Baker et al., 
supra note 70, at 93–94; Dennie, supra note 63, at 124; Hosick, supra note 9. 
295 See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101–02; McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1343–45; Baker et al., 
supra note 70, at 93–94; Dennie, supra note 63, at 124; Hosick, supra note 9; supra notes 
258–276 and accompanying text. 
296 See 20 U.S.C. § 108711(1)–(3)(2006); Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101–02; Brown Univ., 
5 F.3d at 668; McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1343–45; Second Amended Complaint for Plaintiff, 
supra note 14, at 15; Hosick, supra note 9. 
297 See 20 U.S.C. § 108711(1)–(3); Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101–02; McCormack, 845 
F.2d at 1343–45; Hosick, supra note 9. 
298 See NCAA Division I Bylaws, supra note 3, art. 10 (detailing sanctions for unethi-
cal conduct, such as fixing games and using drugs); Hosick, supra note 9. 
299 See NCAA Division I Bylaws, supra note 3, art. 10; Hosick, supra note 9. 
2013] Boston College International & Comparative Law Review 1315 
NCAA sanctions would serve a deterrent function, and thus maintain 
competitive equity.300 Yet, increasing the cap to the full cost of attend-
ance is less restrictive than the MEA’s artificial cap because student-
athletes will be able to receive greater compensation for their services.301 
Therefore, a court would likely hold that setting the cap at the full cost 
of attendance and imposing sanctions for artificially inflating the cost of 
attendance would be less restrictive than the MEA’s $2000 cap.302 
Conclusion 
 For decades the NCAA has limited athletics-based financial aid to a 
level below the full cost of attendance, which it defines as a “full grant-
in-aid.” In October 2011, the NCAA imposed the Miscellaneous Ex-
pense Allowance, which raised the cap on athletics-based financial aid 
by $2000. Shortly thereafter, the MEA was overturned. NCAA members 
will vote on a new proposal later this year. If passed, this legislation will 
likely impose the same $2000 cap as originally proposed. 
 Even if the MEA is adopted, the NCAA will remain vulnerable to 
antitrust litigation by a class of current student-athletes. By adopting 
the framework in White v. NCAA, this group of claimants could success-
fully argue that the NCAA is engaging in horizontal price-fixing. Alt-
hough the MEA would provide a better option for student-athletes than 
the previous “full grant-in-aid,” it would not quite close the gap re-
quired to avoid potential antitrust liability. Until the NCAA sets the cap 
on athletics-based aid at the full cost of attendance, student-athletes will 
continue to have a strong case that the NCAA is in violation of antitrust 
law. 
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